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Abstract
This paper aims at analysing the determinants of the recent wave of European
banks to Brazil in the context of the recent phase of banking
internationalisation. The first part analyses the process of banking
internationalisation from both an analytical and an historical approach.
Focusing on the determinants of the banking internationalisation process, the
paper shows that (i) the recent wave of banking internationalisation is
characterised not only for financial institutions pursuing their existing
relationships, but also and increasingly by a greater integration into the local
market; (ii) banks operating in countries where the banking sector is larger
and more profitable should be able to export a superior skill and are more
likely to expand their activities abroad. The second part of the paper examines
the determinants of the expansion of European banks in Brazil, as well as the
expansion strategy of the four major European banks in Latin America –
BSCH, BBVA, HSBC and ABN-Amro. In this regard, it shows that the recent
wave of European banks entering Latin America and Brazil is determined by
several factors, that include the process of restructuring the banking sector
under the EMU; the dynamics of the internationalisation of the Spanish
banks, since they have been the main players in the recent influx of foreign
banks into Latin America; the process of market deregulation in the region
since the early 1990s, in the broader context of economic and political
reforms; the better prospects of the region for increasing returns to financial
institutions compared to developed countries, as well as the potential gains in
* I am very grateful to Pablo Toral for many helpful comments on a preliminary version of the
paper. All remaining errors are, of course, my responsibility. This paper is part of a research
developed in the Centre for Brazilian Studies, University of Oxford on the determinants and
impacts of the recent wave of European banks in Brazil.
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and data available in November 2001. Email: lfpaula@alternex.com.brefficiency. Besides, it also shows that one of the common features of the four
major European banks in Latin America – BSCH, BBVA, HSBC and ABN-
Amro – is that all the top four are big universal banks that choose to expand
abroad as a strategy to expand their activities. More precisely, expanding
abroad is not only a source of diversification of earnings, but also a way to
strengthen their position in the European banking market under the pressure
of economic and monetary union.
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During the 1970s and 1980s the entry of foreign financial institutions into
Brazil was restricted to minority stakes in investment banks and leasing
companies, although no restrictions were established against the installation
of representative offices. Later, the Constitution of 1988 prohibited foreign
financial institutions from setting up new agencies and increasing the share in
the capital of financial institutions based in the country. However, Article 52
of the Transitory Dispositions Act established that such restrictions would not
apply to the authorisations resulting from international agreements,
reciprocity, or decisions made in the Brazilian government’s interest. In 1995,
due to the banking crisis caused by contagion from the Mexican crisis, the
Brazilian government allowed the entry of some foreign banks in order to
permit the acquisition of some problematic banks and also to strengthen the
national banking sector. Consequently, foreign banks increased their stake in
Brazil and raised from 8.4% in 1995 to 27.4% in 2000. This share of total
assets of the banking sector. Interestingly, European banks (BSCH, HSBC
and ABN-Amro, among others) headed the main operations involving foreign
banks during the 1990s in Brazil.
This paper aims to analyse the determinants of the recent wave of European
banks to Brazil under the context of the recent phase of banking
internationalisation.
The paper is divided into three sections. Section 1 analyses the process of
banking internationalisation. First, it examines this process from a historical
point of view. Banking internationalisation is divided into three phases: the
first begins in the 1830s, led by British institutions within colonial territories
and regions of recent settlement. The second phase begins in the 1960s led by
American banks (and later also by Japanese banks) with more cross-
investments in banking in developed countries. A third phase starts in the
1990s, led by European banks with cross-investments mainly to emerging
countries. Second, the section focuses on the determinants of the banking
internationalisation process, and shows that (i) the recent wave of banking
internationalisation is characterised not only for financial institutions
pursuing their existing relationships – serving mainly home country
customers – but also and increasingly by a greater integration into the local
market; and (ii) banks operating in countries where the banking sector is
7larger and more profitable should be able to export a superior skill and are
more likely to expand their activities abroad.
Section 2 examines the determinants of the expansion of European banks in
Brazil, as well as the expansion strategy of the four major European banks in
Latin America – BSCH, BBVA, HSBC and ABN-Amro. Section 2.1 shows
that the recent wave of European banks entering Latin America and Brazil is
determined by a set of different factors, that includes the process of
restructuring the banking sector under the European Monetary Union (EMU);
the dynamics of the internationalisation of Spanish banks, since they have
been the main players in the recent influx of foreign banks into Latin
America; the process of market deregulation in the region since the early
1990s, in the broader context of economic and political reforms; the better
prospects of the region for increasing returns to financial institution compared
to developed countries, as well as the potential gains in efficiency. In the case
of Brazil, the banking crisis of 1995 was a landmark in this process, since it
resulted in the opening up to the entry of foreign banks. Section 2.2 examines
the recent penetration of European banks in Brazil, and shows that in the
recent wave of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in Brazil: (i) foreign banks
dominated the acquisitions, with the predominance of European banks,
followed step-by-step by some domestic banks; (ii) the two big American
banks in Brazil – Citibank and BankBoston – did not participate in the wave
of acquisitions in Brazil, but opted to grow organically; (iii) the three big
domestic private banks – Bradesco, Itau and Unibanco – reacted to the
penetration of foreign banks, participating actively in the process of M&As.
Consequently, although foreign banks now have an important presence in the
Brazilian market, Brazilian banks still dominate the banking sector. Section
2.3 analyses the expansion strategies of the major European banks in Latin
America: BSCH, BBVA, HSBC and ABN-Amro. One of the common
features of these banks is that they are big universal banks that have chosen
to expand abroad as a strategy to expand their activities. More precisely,
expanding abroad is not only a source of diversification of earnings, but also
a way to strengthen their position in the European banking market under the
pressure of economic and monetary union. The section also emphasises some
specific determinants of expansion of each financial group.
Finally, section 3 summarises the main arguments developed in the paper.
8 Introduction1. Banking Internationalisation
1.1 Banking internationalisation: an historical approach
Banking internationalisation is not something new, as it has been happening
at least since the nineteenth century. According to Jones (1990), there are two
historical waves of multinational corporate banking:
1 one occurred in the
nineteenth century from the 1830s; the other from the 1960s. British
institutions
2 led the first wave, later joined by other European banks.
Multinational banks had their branch networks overwhelmingly concentrated
in colonial territories – in particular parts of the British Empire, notably
Australasia and Southern Africa – and regions of recent settlement, especially
Latin America. Foreign penetration of the domestic banking systems of
Britain, continental Europe or the United States was virtually non-existent.
Thus, imperial connections were the principal factor in explaining the
direction taken by multinational banking in the nineteenth century. During the
first wave of banking internationalisation, domestic retail banking, trade
finance, and investment banking were performed often by the same
institutions.
American banks led the second wave, since the 1960s, though during the
1980s Japanese institutions became increasingly prominent. During this
wave, there were more cross-investments in banking between developed
countries. Multinational banks varied from the nineteenth-century wave in
their geographical location and products. Like the first multinational banks,
they established branches in international financial centres, since the birth of
the Euro-dollar market in London in the late 1950s until the rise of offshore
centres and the growth of the Asian Dollar Market (Bahrain, Singapore and
Hong Kong) in the 1970s. However, beyond these financial centres,
9
1 Jones (1990, p. 1) makes a distinction between the terms ‘international banking’ and
‘multinational banks’, since the former includes foreign trade finance and lending to corporations
and governments resident in foreign countries, while the latter entails only ownership and control
of branches and affiliates in more than one country.
2 The British overseas banks, which began to appear in the 1830s, were headquartered in
Britain but did not conduct domestic banking in that country and initially had no shareholdings
links with domestic British banks. According to Casson (1990, p. 26), “The main reasons for
maintaining the London board were to act as a nexus for links to correspondent banks ... and to
help raise additional funds as required. In the latter context, the role of London as an international
financial centre, with its cheap rediscounting facilities, and well-developed equity market, was
crucial”.multinational banks were far more concerned with developed economies than
their predecessors had been. While American banks were active in Western
Europe, stimulated by the Euro-dollar market, European and Japanese banks
invested in a direct and unprecedented manner in the United States (Jones,
1990, p. 5). During this wave, trade finance, servicing corporate customers
from their country, and retail banking were all found.
A third wave of banking internationalisation seems to have begun during the
1990s. European banks – especially but not exclusively the Spanish banks –
led this wave. One can expect that once the process of banking consolidation
in the United States is complete it is possible that American banks will
participate more actively in the process of banking internationalisation.
3
Multinational banks have expanded their branch networks into Southern Asia,
Central and Eastern Europe and, mainly, Latin America. Some expansion has
also occurred into the United States and the euro zone. During the third wave
of banking internationalisation, due to the process of financial de-regulation,
the predominant type of financial institution has been the universal bank.
4 On
the other hand, one of the principal novelties of this wave in comparison with
the former one is that multinational banks are penetrating the big retail
banking market segment in some emerging countries. Some of them are even
competing for the leadership of the market, in the case of Citibank in Mexico
and BSCH in Brazil.
1.2 Banking internationalisation: the rationale of the expansion
strategy
The pace of cross-border consolidation of financial institutions has increased
over the last few years, and has recently reached the retail banking market.
For the purpose of this section, the relevant question is: Why do banks
headquartered in particular countries set up branches or subsidiaries in
foreign countries?
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3 In the case of the recent wave of M&As in the US, this movement results from the
elimination of geographic restrictions – at both the state and federal levels – on multiple office
banking through both holding companies and branching, the relaxation on activities in which
banks can engage, and finally the bank profit and stock market boom of the last decade which have
reduced the costs of acquisitions. Differently from the 1980s M&As wave, the recent wave, in
addition to consolidation of small units made possible by the removal of branching and multi-
office restrictions, also included an increase in the mergers of large banks with over US$ 1 billion
in assets each (Kregel, 2001).
4 We are considering not only the traditional universal bank (commercial bank plus investment
bank), but also other types of universal banks, such as bancinsurance (commercial bank plus
insurance institution).The literature of the 1970s and 1980s (Grubel, 1977; Aliber, 1984), generally
speaking, built a theory of international banking heavily based on the theory
of direct foreign investment in manufacturing, as advanced by Kindleberger
(1969), Vernon (1966) and Caves (1971). According to this explanation,
multinational banks have some comparative advantages. Banks go abroad to
serve their domestic customers who have gone abroad, which is sometimes
called the ‘gravitational pull effect’. Multinational banking grows in parallel
with direct foreign investment as banks try to meet the demand for banking
services of multinational firms abroad. This bank behaviour of moving abroad
is seen as a defensive strategy necessary to assure the continued business with
the domestic parents of foreign subsidiaries so that the existing flow of
information resulting from the bank-client relationship will not be pre-empted
by a competitor bank. Secondly, multinational service banks also do some
business with local and wealthy individuals by offering them specialised
services and information required for trade and capital market dealings within
their native countries.
The explanation of the motives as to why a bank expands abroad can be
interpreted in price-theoretic terms à la Grubel: “The continuous commercial
contacts between the bank and manufacturing firm permit the bank to have
access to information about the firm’s financial conditions at such a low cost
and high speed that it is in a better position than any other competitor to
evaluate and respond to the firm’s demand for loans”. So, “the ability to draw
on the information and personal contacts between the bank’s and
manufacturing firm’s parents in a [foreign country] at very low marginal cost
represents the main source of comparative advantage that the bank’s foreign
branch has in dealing with the firm’s subsidiary abroad in competition with
the local banks” (Grubel, 1977, pp. 352-3). From this point of view, the
internalisation of information is considered the principal advantage of the
multinational bank.
5 Multinational banks are also regarded as developing
technology and management expertise domestically and then applying them
overseas at low to zero marginal cost. Indeed, this is the case of the large US
banks that are involved in wholesale and business banking. The connection
with other US businesses and with the local customers of these businesses
creates an opportunity to internalise information at a low cost.
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5 In this connection, Casson (1990, p. 18) states that “when technology draws a firm to a new
location abroad, the bank which has serviced the expanding firm at its home location has an
advantage over indigenous firms in serving the new foreign subsidiary. This advantage is goodwill
derived from special knowledge of the customer’s requirements and it is a monopolistic advantage
which is not patentable and which can be transferred abroad. The internalisation of this advantage
transforms the domestic bank into a multinational bank”.Historically, as stressed by Focarelli and Pozzolo (2000, p. 1, italics added),
“the pattern of bank international shareholdings followed that of the
economic integration between countries: banks extended their activities
abroad in order to provide services to their home-country clients in
international transactions; afterwards, with a growing understanding of the
foreign market (in particular of regulatory and institutional aspects) and
a developed network of relationships with local financial institutions, some
banks were induced to increase the range of their operations and provide
services to the local population too. Although this account is likely to be
accurate in general (...) today the actual pattern of bank international
shareholdings depends on a wider range of factors than just the overall
degree of economic integration between countries”. In particular,
Grubel’s theory of internalisation cannot be applied to the retail banking
market, since the majority of the retail customers of foreign banks, have no
previous connection with the banks in their native countries.
The recent wave of bank internationalisation is characterised not only by
financial institutions following their existing relationships, but also (and
increasingly) by global banks seeking to widen their activities in the financial
markets of the host-country mainly through the acquisition of majority,
controlling stakes, or the acquisition of minority, non-controlling stakes.
6
Thus, the present strategy of global, universal banks is aimed at diversifying
their activities into some domestic financial markets through a network of
branches and greater integration into the local market, while in the past
multinational bank strategies were geared mainly to serving their home-
country (corporate) customers, and also to giving some support to domestic
firms to access the international financial market. Such a new strategy has
been, to a larger extent, stimulated by the gradual flexibility (or even in some
cases the abolition) of legal restrictions concerning the presence of
multinational banks in local markets, both in developed and developing
countries (Freitas, 1999).
There are few recent works that try to establish a pattern of expansion for the
recent wave of banking internationalisation.
7 One of the most common
explanations is related to the effects of the increase in banking competition
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6 According to Focarelli and Pozzolo (2000, p. 12) the ‘follow the clients’ determinant for
banking internationalisation is only relevant for small banks, while the behaviour of larger banks
is determined by more complex diversification policies.
7 There are a few exceptions. See, for instance, Berger et al. (2000), and Focarelli and Pozzolo
(2000).caused by financial deregulation. As margins and fees are tightened in
domestic financial services markets, financial firms seek to expand overseas
to generate higher returns. Thus, with banks’ net interest margins under
downward pressure due to the increase of banking competition, and as the big
financial institutions are in general based in mature economies (with low
potential for growth) some banks seek to diversify geographically in markets
with the potential of growth and/or with greater net interest margins.
Generally speaking, banking internationalisation results from the tendency
towards an increase in the minimum scale necessary for a bank to remain
competitive in order to enhance its ability to generate profits. Another
explanation is that there are potential risk-reduction gains from the
diversification of income from multiple products, client groups and
geographies in multi-activity financial services organisations, and these gains
increase with the number of activities undertaken.
8
Overall, the empirical evidence in the literature (Deminguc-Kunt and
Huizinga, 1998; Claessens et al., 1998) shows that foreign financial
institutions are less efficient than domestic institutions, except in developed
countries.
9 To analyse this statement Berger et al. (2000) examined two
hypotheses:
(a) home field advantage hypothesis, under which domestic institutions are
generally more efficient than institutions from foreign nations; the
advantage is in part due to organizational diseconomies in operating (for
instance, turf battles between staff in different nations) or monitoring an
institution from a distance (it can be difficult to evaluate the behaviour
and effort of managers in a distant market), or in part because of
other barriers, including differences in language, culture, currency,
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8 The benefits from earnings diversification may increase bank value in several ways, since
diversification may lower bank risk and reduce the possibility of failure. First, reduced risk directly
translates into reduced probability of incurring distress costs. The literature refers to these efficiency
gains as improvements in the risk/expected return trade-off. It can even motivate cross-border
consolidation, since greater scale, more diverse scope or mix of financial services. On the other
hand, an increased geographical spread of risks associated with cross-border consolidation may
improve the institution’srisk/expected return trade-off (Santomero and Eckles, 2000). The literature
on commercial banks in the US generally found that larger, more geographically diversified
institutions tend to have better risk/expected return trade-offs (Berger et al., 2000, p. 17).
9 Claessens et al. (1998) found some evidence that the entry of foreign banks in domestic
markets diminishes both the average profitability and operational expenses of domestic banks, but
has no significant effect on net interest margins or provision for loan losses. The decrease in
profitability is due to the increase in banking competition, while the reduction in operational
expenses results from an improvement in domestic banks’ organisational and technical
management, or more precisely an improvement in X-efficiency.regulatory/supervisory structures or explicit or implicit barriers against
foreign institutions;
(b) global advantage hypothesis, under which some efficiently managed
foreign institutions are able to overcome the cross-border disadvantages
and operate more efficiently than domestic institutions in other nations,
as they have higher efficiency when operating in other nations by
spreading their superior managerial skills or best-practice policies and
procedures over more resources, lowering operational costs, or obtaining
diversification of risks that allows them to undertake higher expected
return investments.
10
Testing these hypothesis in five countries (France, Germany, Spain, the UK,
and the US) during the 1990s, Berger et al. (2000) show evidence in favour
of a limited form of global advantage hypothesis in which only efficient
institutions in one or a limited number of nations with specific favourable
market or regulatory/supervisory conditions in their home countries can
operate more efficiently than domestic institutions in other nations. This
finding also suggests that some banking organisations can operate in foreign
countries at or above the efficiency levels of domestic banks, paving the way
for some additional global consolidation. A study made by Focarelli and
Pozzolo (2000) shows in the same connection that banks with cross-border
shareholdings are larger and have headquarters in countries with a more
developed and efficient market. Banks operating in countries where the
banking sector is larger and more profitable should be able to export
a superior skill and are therefore more likely to expand their activities
abroad.
11 In particular, local market opportunities – that combine a higher
expected rate of economic growth, a more stable economic environment and
the banks’ inefficiency in the destination country, are the main determinants
of the banks’ decision to expand abroad.
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10 Williams (1997) calls the latter hypothesis as ‘eclectic theory’, that asserts that multinational
banks must have some monopoly advantage to overcome the incumbent’s natural advantage. The
ownership advantage is developed domestically by the multinational bank and then applied
overseas. Following the Hymer-Kindelberger theory, the natural incumbent’s advantages over any
foreign entrant are due to: (i) the knowledge of consumer preferences and institutional features;
and, (ii) the costs associated with distance from the parent, including communications costs, time
in travel, and distance leading to errors (Idem, 1997, p. 92).
11 In the same connection, Hymer’s (apud Guillen and Tschoegl, 1999, p. 18-19) classic
proposition concerning FDI says that: “Given the costs of operating at a distance and in an
unfamiliar environment, the foreign firms must have some off-setting advantage if it is to compete
against local firms.”Banks prefer to invest in countries where expected profits are larger, owing to
higher expected economic growth and the prospect of reducing local banks’
inefficiency. Profit opportunities in host markets have become a key factor in
determining the pattern of foreign bank shareholdings, that includes more
varied forms of foreign bank participation, such as full acquisition, target
purchases of specific activities, joint ventures or alliances with local banks.
In conclusion, international M&A may be induced by the institution’s desire
to increase cost and revenue efficiency or to obtain risk-reducing effects of
diversifications. However, as Berger (2000, p. 7) recognizes, “there is very
little research on the determinants of cross-border consolidation, which could
give information on how banks improve their risk and efficiency positions”.
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2.1 Determinants of European banks’ expansion strategy in Latin
America and Brazil
From the former section one can ascertain that, both from ahistorical-empirical
and a theoretical-analytical point of view, that there are strong reasons to
believe that the process of consolidation in the banking industry is an
international phenomenon, due in part to financial deregulation and
technological changes. The new phase of bank internationalisation is
a consequence of this process, with financial institutions seeking to diversify
their activities – in terms of products and services, and/or geographically – and
increase their minimum scale of operations in order to remain competitive and
to enhance their ability to generate profits. However, it must be recognised that
not all the world’sbig banks aspire to become multinationals. Indeed, there are
examples of successful banks, such as Britain’s Lloyds TSB, which have
chosen not to pursue an aggressive international expansion strategy, but instead
have focused on retail businesses (mortgage market, personal sector banking,
life insurance and the SME market).
Banking crises, deregulation and globalisation of financial services have led
to a significant increase in the presence of foreign banks in emerging
economies in the second half of the 1990s.
12 Consolidation has accelerated in
the banking industry in emerging market economies recently, changing
a traditionally highly protected industry. In this connection, Hawkins and
Mihaljek (2001, p. 3) state that “global market and technology developments,
macroeconomic pressures and banking crises in the 1990s have forced the
banking industry and the regulators to change the old way of doing business,
and to deregulate the banking industry at the national level and open up
financial markets to foreign competition. (...) These changes have
significantly increased competitive pressures on banks in the emerging
economies and have led to deep changes in the structure of the banking
industry”.
17
12 According to Hawkins and Mihaljek (2001, p. 24), in central Europe, the share of foreign
banks in terms of both total of assets and capital is now around two thirds or higher, making these
countries’banking systems among the most open in the world, while in Latin America, the market
share of foreign banks rose from an average of 7 per cent in the beginning of the 1990s to 40 per
cent in 2000.Latin America – including Brazil – received one of the biggest influxes of
foreign direct investment (FDI) in the banking sector during the 1990s.
However, one cannot understand the wave of bank FDI apart from the general
movement of FDI to Latin America during the nineties. Indeed, the Latin
American and Caribbean region received record levels of FDI in the nineties,
with inflows totalling US$ 76.7 billion in 1998 alone, an amount that
corresponded to around 41% of total FDI flows to developing countries. On
the other hand, 42% of these inflows were concentrated in a single country,
Brazil , which is the biggest country of the region and, since 1996, the leading
Latin American FDI recipient and the second-largest destination for FDI
among all developing countries (ECLAC, 2000, pp. 35-6).
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Some of the main determinants of the expansion of European banks in Latin
America can be summarised as follows:
❑ The process of restructuring the banking sector under European
economic and monetary union. For some European banks, expanding
abroad is not only a source of earnings diversification, but also a way of
strengthening their position in the European banking market considering
the increasing market competition of banking in the European Economic
Area. The European bank’s strategy for Latin America may be
interpreted as a response to this more competitive environment, in which
several factors had been eroding income from traditional banking
business.
14 Further, due to political and regulatory constraints, there are
some impediments to M&As within EU countries, but incentives to such
activity outside the bloc.
15 The preference for Latin America, and to
a lesser degree Central and Eastern Europe, is partially because, during
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13 During the nineties, as a result of the implementation of policies that aimed at stabilizing the
economy (the Real Plan), the wide-ranging liberalization process which has opened up previously
restricted activities to foreign investors, the regional integration policies and extensive
privatisations, net FDI inflows to Brazil grew from less than US$ 2 billion in the period 1990-1994
to over US$ 30 billion in the last two years of the decade (ECLAC, 2001, p. 25).
14 This hypothesis is developed in Paula (2002, Chapter 2).
15 One of these incentives is the absence of a single regulatory agency in the European Union
(EU). This has limited the benefits of expanding areas of activity across borders and, at the same
time, prevented European banks from engaging in the diversification of earnings and reduction in
the regulatory capital, practised in the US. Although the Single Market Act and the various
European Commission financial directives should have created some uniformity, difficulties have
arisen and hampered cross-border operations. There are multiple supervisory agencies within
European countries and no co-ordinating agency or single bank regulatory body for the entire euro
area. As a result, M&As remain to a greater extent confined within national borders. See more in
Kregel (2001).the second-half of the nineties, Southeast Asia was in crisis, and Indian
and Chinese financial systems were closed to foreign banks. This left
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico as the main big emerging markets open to
FDI in the bank sector.
❑ In particular, the dynamics of the internationalisation of Spanish banks
since they have been the main participants in the recent wave of foreign
banks entering Latin America. These banks had pursued growth
strategies based on M&As in their natural market before they launched
their international growth strategy.
16 So, they already were ‘mature’
banks when they decided to expand overseas. Indeed, with the
implementation of the EMU and the perspective of the introduction of the
euro, the larger Spanish banks – in particular, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya
(BBV), Banco Santander and Banco Central Hispanico (BSCH) – had to
look beyond their natural borders in search of global markets in order to
maintain their competitive position and to defend themselves from the
threat of hostile bids by either local or foreign competitors. In the initial
stages of this process there was a proliferation of alliances and
cooperation agreements with other financial institutions, chiefly within
the European Union, while the second phase has involved a fast-paced,
aggressive expansion strategy aimed at the main Latin American markets
(ECLAC, 2000, p. 159).
17 During the 1990s, Dutch and German banks
were busy expanding into Central and Eastern Europe, while American
banks were busy with M&As in their own domestic market, leaving Latin
America – also due to cultural linkages – the natural market for the
Spanish banks.
❑ The deregulation process in Latin America, in the broader context of
economic and political reforms, since the early 1990s, made room for the
entry of foreign companies into key economic sectors, such as banking,
telecommunications and utilities. Bank privatisation programmes, in
general, formed part of longer-term public sector reforms, which also
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16 The expansion of Spanish banks to Latin America must also be seen in a broader context in
which, after a period of structural changes in the Spanish economy driven partly by the process of
privatisation of state-firms, the major Spanish service firms (transport, telecommunications,
energy and financial services) decided to expand abroad. Since 1994, Latin America has been the
prime investment destination in the international strategy of these firms, with total figure of
Spanish investments jumping from US$ 4.5 billion in 1990 to over US$ 18.5 billion in 1998
(ECLAC, 2000, p. 133).
17 For an analysis of the expansion strategy of Spanish banks to Latin America, see ECLAC
(2000, Chapter 3), Sebastian and Hernansanz (2000), and Calderon and Casilda (2000).involved privatisation of major public enterprises with the aim of
consolidating the public finances and cutting borrowing requirements
(Hawkins and Mihaljek, 2001, p. 13). Deepening the role of the market
was also a major motive.
❑ The potential of economic growth in Latin America is greater than in
Europe. Although economic growth in Latin America in the past 18 years
has been very similar to that of Europe, at 2.5% (this includes the ‘lost
decade’ of the 1980s), with improving growth prospects, it is expected
that Latin America will grow faster than Europe.
❑ The valuations of Latin American companies, including banks, are much
lower than those of European companies, making it easier to attain
a large market share at a lower cost. According to Sebastian and
Hernansanz, (2000, p. 19), a 1% share of the German deposit market in
1999 cost US$ 2,285 million, if attained by purchasing shares in the
major listed banks.
18 The same share would have represented an outlay of
only US$ 196 million in Argentina and US$ 205 million in Mexico.
❑ The growth potential of banking markets in Latin America is much
greater than in Europe’s mature banking market. The size of the financial
system in terms of the ratio of M3 to GDP is only 28% in Latin America,
while in the euro area it is 77% and in the US 71% (Sebastian and
Hernansanz, 2000, p. 18).
❑ The Latin American banking sector offers much better prospects for
increasing returns to financial institutions, since the intermediation
margins with which banks operate in these countries are considerably
higher than in the developed world. While the domestic banks’ average
margin on assets (net interest income over total assets) in Latin America
was 5.76% for the period 1988-95 (in Brazil it was 6.6% and Argentina
9.9%), in OECD’s countries it was 2.80% for the same period (Claessens
et al., 1998, p. 26). On the other hand, Latin American banks steadily
improved their already high profitability during the 1990s, although net
interest revenue has been stable. Their profitability is high both
compared to G3’s countries and other emerging countries (Table 1).
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18 The major listed German banks are: Deutsche Bank, Bayerische Hypo und Vereinsbank,
Dresdner Bank, Commerzbank, and Bankgesellschaft Berlin.❑ The potential gains in efficiency are high in Latin America, since the
degree of banking efficiency is in general lower than in developed
countries. The domestic banks’ ratio of operating costs to assets in Latin
America was on average 5.5% in 1992-1997, while it was 1.7% in G3
countries (US, Japan and Germany), 1.6% in East Asia and 4.1% in
Central Europe, in the same period (Table 1). The high operating cost (as
well as high interest rate spreads) of domestic banks in Latin America are
in large part the legacy of the high-inflation period of the 1980s and the
early 1990s, when inflationary revenues generated easy profits for the
banks and, consequently, there was little pressure to cut costs.
TABLE 1
Banking sector performance, 1992-1999
(as a percentage of total assets)
Source: Hawkins and Mihaljek (2001, p. 6).
(*) Simple average of Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand.
(**) Simple average of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru.
(***) Simple average of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.
(****) Simple average of Germany, Japan and United States.
The former section stressed that the main determinant of the decision of
a bank to expand abroad are local market opportunities, higher expected rates
of economic growth, more stable economic conditions, and bank inefficiency
in the host-country. Accordingly, in the case of Brazil, internal determinants
of the recent penetration of foreign banks are mainly related to the more stable
economic conditions, due to price stabilisation since 1994 which changed the
long-term business landscape in Brazil, the higher expected rates of economic
growth, and the growth potential of the banking market. Besides, since the
early 1990s, the Brazilian economy has been undergoing a wide-ranging
liberalisation process, which has opened up previously restricted activities to
foreign investors. In this context, the recent entry of foreign banks is related
to the gradual flexibility of the legal restrictions concerning the presence of
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East Asia* Latin America** Central Europe*** G3****
1992- 1998 1999 1992- 1998 1999 1992- 1998 1999 1992- 1998 1999
97 97 97 97
Net interest
Revenue 2.6 1.8 2.2 5.2 5.3 5.4 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.0 1.8 2.0
Other income 0.7 1.2 0.8 2.3 2.0 1.8 2.3 2.1 2.0 0.7 0.8 1.0
Operating costs 1.6 2.4 2.3 5.5 5.5 5.7 4.1 3.5 3.1 1.7 1.6 1.8
Loan losses 0.6 6.3 1.8 1.2 1.1 1.7 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.3
Pre-tax profits 0.8 -5.5 -0.7 1.4 1.3 2.4 0.5 0.7 1.0 0.7 0.6 0.8foreign banks in the Brazilian banking sector. Article 52 of the Transitory
Dispositions Act of the Constitution of 1988 prohibits, until regulated by
complementary law, the installation of new agencies for foreign financial
institutions and the increase of shares in the capital of financial institutions
based in the country. However, the Constitution of 1988 keeps open the
possibility of foreign institutions having access to the domestic market, since
article 52 also established that such restrictions do not apply to authorisations
resulting from international agreements, reciprocity, or decisions made in the
Brazilian government’s interest.
19
A particularly important change occurred in 1995, when a banking crisis
resulted from a tightening monetary policy and rising interest rates in
response to the effects of the Mexican crisis of 1994-95. According to
Carvalho (2000, p. 148), “the banking crisis of 1995 opened a window of
opportunity for foreign banks to set foot in the country. The crisis devalued
the existing banks, putting a larger number of them under the control of the
central bank, without compromising, it seemed, long-term possibilities for the
industry. In a report dated December 1998, the central bank of Brazil
identified 104 financial institutions as going through some kind of
‘adjustment’ between the launching of the Real Plan and that date”.
The recent process of bank consolidation in Brazil is in some ways similar to
the Mexican experience in the sense that in both countries the authorities
responded to the banking crisis with an array of support programmes for
financial institutions and their borrowers. These programmes were intended
to bolster the health of the financial sector and, at the same time, open the
sector to foreign banks, in the hope that the presence of these banks would
help strengthen the banking sector.
20 Besides, the entry of foreign banks was
used as a policy to weaken the effect of local monopolies that had been
established under the previous regulatory structure.
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19 See Table 2 for more information on Brazilian legislation on foreign capital in banking
sector.
20 See Dages et al. (2000) for an analysis on the recent foreign bank penetration in Mexico and
Argentina. In the Brazilian case, the federal government launched, in November 1995,
a programme to finance the absorption of problem banks by healthy ones, PROER, that financed
the acquisitions of seven banks, according to a report on Brazilian banks (Gazeta Mercantil,
16/9/1999): Nacional by Unibanco (Brazilian bank); Economico by Excel (Brazilian); Mercantil
de Pernambuco by Banco Rural (Brazilian); Banco Antonio de Queiroz by Banco United
(Brazilian); Banorte by Bandeirantes (Brazilian); Banco Martinelli by Pontual (Brazilian);
Bamerindus by HSBC (British).TABLE 2
Changes in Brazilian legislation on foreign capital in the banking sector
Source: Own elaboration with information from Puga (1999).
In this context, the Brazilian government allowed the entry of some foreign
banks to acquire some problematic banks – such as Excel-Economico and
Bamerindus – and also to strength the national banking sector. The
Legislative Intent (‘Exposicao de Motivos’) no. 311, of 23/8/95, allowed the
President to authorise on a case-by-case basis the entry of foreign banks into
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Norms Year Description
Law 4,131 1962 This law applied the principle of reciprocity on the question of
allowing foreign institutions entry into the Brazilian financial
system. Article 50 established “that to foreign banks authorized to
operate in Brazil” would be applied the “same barriers or
restrictions that the legislation in their countries of origin imposed
on Brazilian banks wanting to establish in them”, and Article 51
established that banks whose headquarters are located in countries
where the law imposes restrictions on the operation of Brazilian
banks are prohibited from acquiring more than 30% of voting
capital.
Law 4,595 1964 This law established that the entry of foreign financial institutions
could only be done by means of prior  authorization by the Central
Bank or by a Congressional decree. As a result of this law, foreign
investor’s entry into the domestic financial system was restricted
to a minority share in investment banks and leasing companies, but
no restrictions were placed on the installation of representative
offices.
Constitution  of  1988 1988 Article 52 of the Transitory Dispositions Act prohibited, until
regulated by complementary law, the installation in Brazil, of new
agencies for foreign institutions based in the country and of
individuals or companies domiciled abroad. However, the
Constitution of 1988 kept open the possibility of foreign financial
institutions having access to the domestic market, since Article 52
also established that such restrictions did not apply to
authorisation resulting from international agreements, reciprocity,
or decisions made in the Brazilian government’s interest.
Legislative Intent 311 1995 This norm, authored by the Minister of Finance and approved by
the President of the Republic, established that it was in the interest
of the country to allow entry or increase the participation of
foreign institutions in the domestic financial system. Among the
most salient aspects were: a shortage of national capital; greater
operational efficiency and financial capacity of foreign banks, with
positive effects on the price of services and the cost of funds
offered to the public; the introduction of new technologies.Brazil. On that occasion, the Brazilian government announced that foreign
banks would not be allowed to open new branches or acquire smaller banks
unless they purchased one of the troubled banks. The norms establish that the
entrance of foreign banks must be in the interest of the country, and
emphasises the following favourable aspects:
21
➢ improvement in operational efficiency of the banking sector with positive
effects on bank intermediation;
➢ increase in banking competition would cause a reduction in the spreads
and banking fees, with positive impacts on the loans rate of interest;
➢ diversification and improvement of the supply of financial services with
lowest costs;
➢ introduction of new management technologies and innovations in
products and services.
Thus, as a result of the greater flexibility in the regulatory framework
concerning the entry of foreign banks, the Brazilian government permitted the
entry of a great number of foreign banks, moving in the direction of the
international tendency of expanding financial conglomerates that are looking
for new markets for their businesses. Another factor that attracted foreign
banks to Brazil was the programme of privatisation of state-owned banks,
known as PROES.
22 As Hawkins and Mihaljek (2001, p. 13) pointed out,
“when the programme for restructuring of the state-owned banks is completed
in about two years, only six banks are expected to remain in public hands,
compared with 30 banks in mid-1996. The speed of this change has been
attributed to the federal government’s commitment to finance all the costs of
restructuring provided that the state-owned banks are either privatised,
converted into developments agencies, or liquidated”.
The changes in the regulatory framework concerning foreign banks, the
programme of privatisation of state-owned banks, the price stabilisation since
1994, the growing potential of the Brazilian retail banking market, the
development – still infant – of pension funds and securities market in Brazil,
the increasing integration of the Brazilian economy into commercial and
financial flows, taken together, have attracted foreign capital to the Brazilian
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21 See, also, Almeida, Jr et al. (1997).
22 The programme of incentives for the restructuring of the state public financial system
(PROES) was laid down in August 1996 by the Provisional Measure 1,514. The PROES forms
part of a comprehensive process of state fiscal adjustment and debt restructuring. Under PROES
arrangements, the federal government finances the restructuring of state banks. See more on
PROES in Maia (2000).banking sector. It is interesting to note that European banks headed the main
banking acquisitions involving foreign banks during 1990s, which suggests
that the wave of banking acquisitions and mergers in Brazil is somehow
related to changes in the European financial system under the monetary and
economic union.
2.2 The recent European banks wave in Brazil: a portrait
The recent wave of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in the banking sector
in Brazil involved, first, the purchase of failing banks by prosperous ones,
typified by the acquisition of Nacional by Unibanco, Economico by Excel,
and Bamerindus by HSBC. Furthermore, and increasingly, bank take-overs
embraced a strong bidder and sometimes a weak, but not yet insolvent, target,
such as in the acquisitions of BCN by Bradesco, Noroeste by Santander, and
Real by ABN-Amro.
Table 3 lists M&As in the Brazilian banking sector during the period 1995-
2000. The table shows that:
a) Foreign banks dominated acquisitions, with an obvious predominance of
European banks. Unlike in neighbouring Argentina, where foreign bank
acquisitions included two of the largest three private banks, foreign
acquisitions in Brazil mainly involved medium-sized banks. This partly
reflects the fact that market capitalisation of the very largest banks has
proven to be prohibitive.
b) The principal foreign acquisitions, in terms of size, were the purchase of
Bamerindus by HSBC (that was paradigmatic since it embraced for the
first time a big domestic retail bank), Excel/Economico by BBVA,
America do Sul by Sudameris, Banco Noroeste by Santander, Banco
Real by ABN-Amro, and Banespa by BSCH.
23 The last case was the
biggest acquisition of recent years in Brazil, since it involved the
purchase of a bank with assets worth around US$ 15 billion. This
acquisition allowed Banco Santander do Brasil to jump in the ranking of
banks to become the third largest private bank in Brazil and the fifth
major bank in the global ranking, including state-owned banks. Banespa
has a strong retail network, mainly in the State of São Paulo, the richest
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23 Santander also acquired Banco Geral do Comercio (1997) and Meridional Group (2000),
while ABN-Amro acquired Banco do Estado de Pernambuco (1998) which had an important
presence in the Northeast region of Brazil.Brazilian state, but at the same time has high overhead costs. Its
acquisition was a ‘turning point’ in the history of BSCH in Brazil, since
prior to the Banespa acquisition in November 2000, Santander do
Brasil’s relatively modest investments in Meridional and the prestigious
investment bank Bozano, Simonsen left the group still locked out of the
market elite at number 7 in the banking industry.
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c) The big American banks already established in Brazil – Citibank and
Bank Boston – did not participate in the wave of M&As, but have opted
to grow organically in the Brazilian banking market, where they
traditionally have focused their activities on a smaller and more selective
clientele.
25 The recent strategy of these banks in Brazil has been to
increase their customer base, including segments of the middle class and
medium-sized firms. BankBoston has sought to perform in a more
selected segment of the retail market, with a required monthly client
income of over R$ 4,000.00, while Citibank has sought to augment its
customer base to include lower segments of the middle class, with
monthly income over R$ 1,000.00, as well as firms with annual incomes
over R$ 5 million. The timid presence of American banks in the recent
wave of M&As in Brazil can be partly explained by the fact that they
have obtained good profitability with the offer of new products in their
own domestic market (United States), where they could expand
geographically within the country due to the deregulation of the financial
system. Consequently, the overseas geographic diversification strategy,
in particular in Latin America, became secondary for the overall strategy
of American banks, with the possible exception of Mexico, which has
strong linkages with the American economy via NAFTA, and where
Citibank recently bought the Grupo Financiero Banamex-Accival
(“Banacci”) and in the process became the leader of the Mexican banking
sector.
d) The three major domestic private banks – Bradesco, Itau and Unibanco –
have reacted to the penetration of foreign banks, participating actively in
26 Expansion Strategies of European Banks in Brazil
24 The Meridional Group, that included Banco Meridional and Bozano, Simonsen, was bought
by BSCH for close to US$ 1 billion, while Banespa was bought for US$ 3.7 billion, a sum five
times higher than its book value. According to The Banker (January, 2001, p. 98), “with [the
purchase of] Banespa at a stroke, [BSCH] has more than doubled its asset from R$ 20bn
($10.17bn) to nearly R$ 50bn, and has added 572 branches and nearly 30,000 employees. It has
jumped to fifth place in the league table, ahead of Brazil’s third largest private bank Unibanco”.
25 BankBoston and mainly Citibank’s recent acquisitions of local banks or branches in Latin
America suggest that banks’ strategies may be changing.the process of mergers and acquisitions, with some important purchases,
such as Nacional by Unibanco, BCN/Credireal by Bradesco, Banerj by
Itau and Bandeirantes by Unibanco. Particularly important has been the
participation of Itau in the purchase of state banks, such as Banestado
(Parana), Banerj (Rio) and Bemge (Minas Gerais). In the case of
Unibanco and Itau – both smaller than Bradesco, the largest private bank
– their behaviour took partly the form of a defensive reaction, since they
tried to maintain their market share and leadership in the banking market,
using acquisitions/mergers in order to avoid take-overs.
26
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26 See more on the reaction of domestic private banks in Brazil in Paula (2002, Part IV).TABLE 3
Main M&As in the Brazilian banking sector, 1995-2000
Year Acquirer Origin of acquirer Institution acquired
BSCH Spain Banespa
2000 Itau Brazil Banestado
Bradesco Brazil Boavista
Unibanco Brazil Bandeirantes/Credibanco
BSCH Spain Meridional/Bozano Simonsen
1999 Bradesco Brazil Banco do Estado da Bahia(Baneb)
Bradesco/BCN Brazil Pontual
1998 ABN-Amro Netherlands Banco Real
ABN-Amro Netherlands Banco do Estado de Pernambuco
Itau Brazil Bemge
Unibanco Brazil Dibens
Sudameris(Intesa/Credit Agricole) Italy/France/Brazil America do Sul
Chase Manhattan United States Patrimonio
Bradesco Brazil Pontual
GE Capital United States Banco Mappin
CSFB Switzerland Banco Garantia
BBVA Spain Excel-Economico
Caixa Geral de Depositos Portugal Bandeirantes
1997 Santander Spain Banco Noroeste
Banco Interatlantico Portugal/France Boavista
Santander Spain Banco Geral de Comercio
Itau Brazil Banerj
Bradesco Brazil BCN/Credireal
HSBC United Kingdom Bamerindus
Bozano Simonsen Brazil Meridional
Swiss Bank Corporation Switzerland Omega
Robert Fleming United Kingdom Graphus
NationsBank United States Liberal
American Express United States SRL
Banco de Crédito Nacional (BCN) Brazil Credireal
Mellon Bank United States Brascan
Llyods United Kingdom Multiplic/Losango
Unibanco Brazil Fininvest (50%)
Icatu Brazil Fininvest (50%)
1996 Banco de Credito Nacional Brazil Itamarati
Cindam Brazil Fonte
Banque Nacional de Paris France Banco Comercial de Sao Paulo
BBA Creditanstalt Brazil/Austria Financiadora Mappin
Itau Brazil Banco Francñs e Brasileiro
Itamarati Brazil Crefisul
Excel Brazil Economico
Sudameris Brasil Italy/France/Brazil Financeiro&Industrial Investimento
1995 Unibanco Brazil Nacional
Pontual Brazil Digibanco
Source: Author’s elaboration with information from Chase Manhattan (2000) and Central Bank of
Brazil.
28 Expansion Strategies of European Banks in BrazilThe growing presence of foreign banks in Brazil is confirmed by the available
data. In terms of market share, banks controlled by foreign financial groups
have raised their stake from 7.2% in 1994 and 12.8% in 1997 to 27.4% in 2000
of the total of the assets in the banking sector in just six years, while the
participation of all other segments,
27 especially state-owned banks, declined
(Table 4). The increase of foreign banks in Brazil occurred, to a greater extent,
in domestic private banks and, to a lesser extent, on state and federal-owned
banks.
28Although there is a declining trend in the relative share in the segment
of the public banks (both state and federal ones), including the two ‘giants’,
Caixa Economica Federal and Banco do Brasil, their relative share is still
highest with 36.6% of total assets by end-2000, followed by domestic private
banks (35.2%). On the other hand, the major domestic private banks in Brazil
have increased their market share in the banking sector via M&As of state and
private-banks and, to some extent, by organic growth. Consequently, the
market share in the banking sector (total of assets of both public and private
banks) of the top 4 domestic private banks – Bradesco, Itau, Unibanco and
Safra – increased from 23.7% in 1999 to 27.6% in 2000, a significant increase
of 3.9 percentage points in their market share in just one year (Table 5).
TABLE 4
Market share of the banking sector in Brazil (total assets), 1993-1999 (%)
Source: Central Bank of Brazil
(*) Excluding the two big federal banks: Caixa Economica Federal and Banco do Brasil.
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Institution 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Banks with foreign 8.35 7.16 8.39 9.79 12.82 18.38 23.19 27.4
control
Private domestic 40.67 41.21 39.16 39 36.76 35.29 33.11 35.2
banks
Public banks 13.41 18.17 21.9 21.92 19.06 11.37 10.23 5.6
(+Caixa estadual)*
Caixa Economica 14.51 14.98 16.4 16.47 16.57 17.02 17.06 15.4
Federal
Banco do  22.93 18.28 13.91 12.52 14.42 17.44 15.7 15.6
Brasil
Credit 0.13 0.2 0.24 0.3 0.37 0.5 0.7 0.8
co-operatives
Banking 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
sector
27 With the exception of the credit co-operatives, whose market share is negligible.
28 We are considering in this section ‘state banks’ as banks whose main owners are the
government of Brazilian states, and ‘federal banks’, the banks whose main owner is the federal
government.TABLE 5
Market share of the 20 major banks’ conglomerates in Brazil (total assets), 1999/2000*
Source: Author’s elaboration with data from Central Bank of Brazil.
(*) The table includes only depository institutions in Brazil (commercial banks, multiple banks
and caixas).
Notes: FE: federal banks; DP: domestic private banks (more than 50% shares in domestic hands);
FO: foreign bank; ST: state-owned bank.
Furthermore, the major Brazilian domestic banks are regional leaders in Latin
America, reflecting both the size of the national economy and the dynamism
of Brazilian banks that could survive and even expand their activities during
the period of high inflation. In 1999, eight Brazilian banks were included in
the ranking of the 15 biggest domestic banks in Latin America (Table 6).
Besides, the four biggest banks are also Brazilian (two public banks and two
private banks). One should also notice, from Table 5, that the top 5 banks in
Brazil had 57.6% of total bank assets in 2000. This market share, that includes
two federal banks, two domestic private banks and one foreign bank, is high
in comparison with the United States (17%), Japan (31%), Germany (17%)
and Italy (25%), but is not so high in comparison with France (57%), United
Kingdom (47%), Spain (47%) and Canada (78%). There is no precise pattern
of banking concentration in the OECD countries. Although middle and small
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Bank conglomerate Ownership 2000 2000 1999
RS$ million (% total assets) (% total assets)
Banco do Brasil FE 128,486  15.99 17.78
CEF FE 126,080 15.69 17.01
Bradesco+BCN+Credireal+Baneb+Boavista DP 87,503 10.89 10.10
Itau+Bemge+Banestado+Banerj DP 67,757 8.43 6.74
Santander+Banespa FO 53,103 6.61 2.95
Unibanco+Bandeirantes+Credibanco+Dibens DP 43,605 5.43 4.41
ABN-Amro Real + Bandepe FO 29,809  3.71 3.31
Safra DP 22,632 2.82 2.45
BankBoston FO 22,425 2.79 2.60
HSBC FO 20,942 2.61 2.55
Citibank FO 20,184 2.51 1.94
Nossa Caixa ST 18,475  2.30 2.15
Sudameris+América do Sul FO 15,332  1.91 1.95
BBA Creditanstalt DP 10,451 1.30 1.26
BBV FO 8,122 1.01 0.96
Banrisul ST 7,723 0.96 0.88
Votorantim DP 7,483 0.93 n.a.
Mercantil de São Paulo DP 6,935  0.86 0.77
Lloyds TSB FO 6,917  0.86 n.a.
Chase Manhattan FO 5,329  0.66 n.a.countries – such as Belgium (57%), Netherlands (79%), Sweden (90%) and
Finland (77%) – in general have more concentrated banking markets, there
are some important exceptions, such as Italy.
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Figure 1 shows that among the twelve biggest private banks in Brazil, seven
banks are foreign owned, including five top European banks – HSBC, ABN-
Amro, Santander (BSCH), Sudameris, and BBV Banco (BBVA) – and two
are American banks – Citibank and BankBoston, respectively from the groups
Citicorp and FleetBoston, respectively. The top 12 private banks constituted
around 40% of total banking assets (including federal and state-owned banks)
and 78.3% of the total of assets of the private banking sector by end-2000. In
December 2000, the five big domestic private banks together (Bradesco, Itau,
Unibanco, Safra and BBA) had 28.8% of total assets, while the seven big
foreign banks had 21.1% (Table 5). Therefore, domestic private banks still
dominate the private banking sector in Brazil, although foreign banks now
have an important presence in the Brazilian market. Santander, in particular,
after the purchase of Banespa in November 2000, became the biggest foreign
bank in Brazil and the third largest private bank, after Bradesco and Banco
Itau. Therefore, domestic private banks are still hegemonic in Brazil
compared to foreign banks, although the relative share of foreign banks has
increased a great deal in recent years.
30
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29 All data were extracted from BIS (1999, p. 45).
30 If one considers Latin America as a whole one can see that foreign banks’ share of total
deposits jumped from 16% in 1996 to 30% in 1998 (ECLAC, 2000, p. 161). On the other hand,
among the top 5, there are three foreign banks and only two national banks. According to data
from the site of Banco Santander do Brasil, in 2000, BSCH had 10.6% of total assets in the region,
BBVA 7.5%, Bradesco 4.5%, Citibank 4.0%, Banamex 3.6% (thus, Citibank plus Banamex had
together 7.6% of the total assets), and Itau 3.1%.TABLE 6
Top 15 banks, Latin America, 1999*
Source: Euromoney, September 2000
(*) Total assets criteria.
(**) Including Credireal, BCN and Baneb.
(***) Including BEMG, BFB and Banerj.
(*) Top 12 refers to financial conglomerates (see Table 5).
(**) Total assets include only private banks.
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Ranking Bank Country Total assets – US$m
1 Banco do Brasil Brazil 70,684
2 Caixa Economica Federal Brazil 68,441
3 Banco Bradesco** Brazil 60,199
4 Banco Itau*** Brazil 33,241
5 Banco Nacional de Mexico
(Banamex) Mexico 32,498
6 Bancomer Mexico 27,497
7 Unibanco Brazil 20,121
8 Banca Serfin Mexico 19,055
9 Banca de la Nacion Argentina Argentina 17,751
10 Banespa Brazil 15,617
11 Banco Internacional (Bital) Mexico 13,248
12 Banco de Galícia Argentina 12,519
13 Banco Safra Brazil 10,077
14 Banco del Estado de Chile Chile 9,400
15 Nossa Caixa – Nosso Banco Brazil 8,6352.3 Expansion strategies of the major European banks: BSCH, BBVA,
HSBC and ABN-Amro
As we have seen in Section 2.2, Grubel’s theory of internalisation does not
apply to the recent wave of multinational bank expansion into retail banking
markets in emerging countries. Indeed, this is the case of the European banks
– BSCH, BBVA, HSBC and ABN-Amro – that expanded to Brazil during the
nineties by buying local retail banks, since most of their customers are
Brazilian, that is, they do not have any previous connection with parents’
firms from the same native country of the banking group.
According to Focarelli and Pozzolo (2000), banks operating in countries
where the banking sector is larger and more profitable should be able to
export a superior skill and, therefore, be more likely to expand their activities
abroad. Indeed, all the biggest European banks in Latin America – BSCH,
BBVA, HSBC and ABN-Amro – have recently increased their market share
in their domestic markets via mergers and acquisitions, attaining top (or
important) positions in these markets.
31 Expanding abroad is not only a source
of earnings diversification for these banks, but also a way to strengthen their
position in the European banking market under the competitive pressure of
economic and monetary union.
There are some common and some distinct features in the strategies of the
biggest European banks in Latin America. One obvious common feature is
that all of the top four are big universal banks that chose to invest abroad as
a strategy to expand their activities. In 1997, overseas income represented
more than 35.0% of the total revenues of these banks (Nellis et al., 2000,
p. 57), and this relative share increased in the case of the Spanish banks,
because of their recent acquisitions in Latin America.
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31 To mention only the more recent and important M&As involving these banks, HSBC bought
Midland in 1992, lifting the group’s total assets from £ 86 billion in 1991 to over £ 170 billion in
1992, creating one of the largest financial organisations of its kind in the world; ABN mergered
with AMRO in 1991 and got the leadership in the banking market in Netherlands; Santander
mergered with Banco Central Hispanico (a former merger between Banco Central and Hispanico)
in 1999, becoming the largest Spanish financial group; afterwards, BBV (a former merger between
Bilbao and Vizcaya) mergered with Argentaria, forming the second largest Spanish financial
group. Consequently, the Spanish banking sector became one of the most highly concentrated in
Europe, forming a sort of duopoly, with the market share of the two major institutions growing
from 33% in 1987 to 50% in 1996 (ECLAC, 2000, p. 158), and increasing even more after the
recent mergers.TABLE 7
Biggest foreign banks in Latin America by assets, September 2000 (USD million)
Bank Origin Argentina Brazil Mexico Chile Colombia Venezuela TOTAL %
BSCH* Spain 26,130 28,682 20,100 30,200 1,376 2,556 109,044 33.99
Citibank** USA 10,429 8,798 42,590 6,350 1,137 686 69,990 21.81
BBVA Spain 9,174 5,004 37,300 4,900 2,811 3,700 62,889 19.60
BankBoston USA 11,350 9,315 358 6,800 108 27,931 8.71
HSBC UK 5,016 9,126 15,202 29,344 9.15
ABN-Amro Netherlands 2,801 15,581 154 2,900 110 95 21,641 6.75
TOTAL 64,900 76,506 115,704 51,150 5,542 7,037 320,839 100.00
Source: Own elaboration with data from Sebastian and Hernansanz (2000, p. 37); Banco
Santander (Banespa-Brazil); and Gazeta Mecantil (Banacci-Mexico).
(*) Including Banespa, with data from November 2000.
(**) Including Banacci, with data from December 2000.
All these financial groups are seeking to expand their activities in Europe, as
it is the case of HSBC in France,
32 and ABN-Amro in Italy. They are also
present in other Latin American countries, but this presence is uneven, as can
be seen in Table 7. The total assets of the 20 largest foreign banks in the
region are highly concentrated in just three banks – BSCH, Citibank and
BBVA – which accounted for 44.8% of total assets of foreign banks in Latin
America in 1998 (ECLAC, 2000, p. 61). Interestingly, these are among the
few banks in the world to have achieved top positions outside their natural
markets. Their market share has increased further, since they purchased some
of the big domestic banks after 1998, such as Bancomer by BBVA (June
2000), Serfin (May 2000) and Banespa (November 2000) by BSCH, and
Banacci (May 2001) by Citigroup.
33 Furthermore, they are the only banks
with an extensive network of branches in the six biggest countries of the
region. Although ABN-Amro has investments in various Latin American
countries, it is only in Brazil that it has a relatively important presence, in
particular due to the purchase of the Banco Real in Brazil in 1998. HSBC
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32According to HSBC’sAnnual Review 2000, the acquisition of the French bank, CCF (Crédit
Commercial de France) “was a major step forward for our wealth management strategy and gives
us a substantial platform in the euro zone” (p. 3). Indeed, with 692 branches, CCF is one of the
largest banks in France.
33 Mexico saw a sweeping reorganization of foreign banking operations in 2000-2001, that
changed sharply its financial system, with BSCH acquiring Grupo Serfin for US$ 1.56 billion,
BBVA putting up US$ 1.85 billion to merger its Mexican operations with Grupo Bancomer, and,
finally, Citibank acquiring Grupo Banacci, the Mexico’s top financial institution, in a transaction
that involved a total value of US$ 12.5 billion.assets are concentrated in the three main countries of Latin America: Mexico,
Brazil and Argentina.
One should also notice in Table 7 that Citibank – part of the Citigroup –
became the second biggest foreign bank in Latin America after the purchase
of Mexico’s top financial institution, Banacci. Although Citibank has been
present in all important Latin American countries for a long time, only in
Mexico does it have market leadership. Historically, only Citibank – and
more recently HSBC – pursued a global strategy in retail banking with
a presence in different countries and continents, although this bank has tended
to focus its businesses on credit card and banking services for an urban
professional class without, at least until the recent acquisition of Banacci
group, attempting to enter the mass retail market as the Spanish banks have
been doing. Therefore, the focus of their businesses in Latin America are quite
different, compared to the Spanish banks, as stressed by Guillen and Tschoegl
(1999, p. 10): “The Spaniards are competing in the lower and middle-income
(LMI) markets where they come into competition with the largest domestic
banks. The only foreign bank that had previously made forays into Latin
America comparable in its geographic scope was Citibank. By contrast to the
Spanish banks, Citibank traditionally focused on the upper-income market,
frequently referred to as the A, B, and C1 segments.”
The really big European investors in Latin America are the two big Spanish
banks, which have recently developed an aggressive strategy of expansion in
the region. BSCH and BBVA together have more than US$ 170,000 million
of assets in Latin America and around 55.8% of the total assets of the Top 6
foreign banks in the region (Table 7). BSCH, after the purchase of Banco
Serfin in Mexico and Banespa in Brazil, became the biggest private bank of
the region, with more than US$ 100,000 million in assets. BSCH is the leader
among foreign banks in Argentina, Brazil and Chile, while BBVAis the leader
in Colombia and Venezuela, and the second major bank in Mexico. The
difference in terms of total assets between BSCH and BBVAin Latin America
is due mainly to Brazil, where recently BSCH bought Banespa and BBVAhas
only a small market share.
ABN-Amro, in the Dutch market, and BSCH and BBVA, in the Spanish
market, grew substantially in their domestic market-pursuing growth strategies
based on M&As in order to obtain a leadership position in their national
markets. This policy allowed them to increase their competitiveness and to
reach the necessary size to develop their international expansion. After they
consolidated their positions in their domestic markets (and sometimes at the
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increase in European competition in the context of the economic and monetary
union.
34 ABN-Amro, BSCH and BBVA are big banks in small or medium
highly concentrated systems that are increasingly expanding their operations
to other geographical markets, since domestic alternatives are limited.
Although the structural constraints were (and are) in some way similar for all
European banks, and these constraints were determinant for the international
expansion of some financial groups, each group has its own distinct business
philosophy and a distinct strategy of internationalisation.
Hong Kong Shanghai Bank – HSBC is one of the largest banking and
financial services organisations in the world. Like Citigroup, HSBC Group is
a global universal bank with around 6,500 offices in 79 countries and
territories in Europe, the Asia-Pacific region, the Americas, the Middle East
and Africa. The group moved its domicile from Hong Kong to London only
recently, in 1992, after the Midland acquisition. HSBC is still a bank strongly
rooted in Asia, in spite of its worldwide presence. However, this feature has
changed over the last decade. Its strategy of ‘managing for value’emphasises
the group’s balance of business and earnings between the older, mature and
faster-growing emerging markets.
35 According to the Annual Review 2000,
the group made 48.2% of its profits in Asia, 39.0% in Europe, 9.6% in North
America, and 3.2% in Latin America in 2000. The motivation of the recent
expansion to Latin America, as well as other investments in different regions,
seems to be related to the strategy of risk diversification through geographic
diversification of their activities, so that the bank is no longer so Asia-
dependent. It is interesting to note that HSBC itself significantly toned down
its plan to challenge local market leaders, bombastically announced at the
time of the purchase of Bamerindus in Brazil. From the aggressive early
discourse about occupying all market niches and reducing the price of bank
services across the board, HSBC officials changed to a more cautious view
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34 With reference to the Spanish banks, Guillen and Tschoegl (1999, p. 4) state that by the late
1980s “competition [in Spain] for market share intensified and the government encouraged
mergers as a way to break the cartel and to prepare for European integration. Net interest margins
fell, and, though still solid, the banks worried about their long-term profitability. Besides entering
new product market – stock brokerage, pension funds, and value-added services – several of the
big banks began to view international expansion as a way to enhance profitability by exploiting
their skills more fully.”
35 The acquisition in 1999 of Republic New York Corporation and Safra Republic Holdings
reinforced HSBC’s presence in highly developed countries – the United States, Switzerland and
Luxembourg.that price wars would damage everyone (Carvalho, 2000, p. 160). Since
Bamerindus focused on low-middle income customers, HSBC has sought to
change its strategy to increase its customer base to include higher income
customers. The bank divided its clientele into three groups: Premier class, for
customers with monthly income up to R$ 5,500; Gold class for customers
with monthly income from R$ 3,000 to R$ 5,500; and, finally, Global class
for customers with monthly income from R$ 750 to R$ 3,000.
ABN-Amro’stwo most important markets are outside the Netherlands, the US
Midwest
36 and Brazil, although the group has a presence in a number of
countries around the world. According to its Annual Report 2000, North
America contributed 44.0% of the profits of the group outside the Netherlands,
while Latin America and the Caribbean 24.1%. These data are evidence of the
importance of North and Latin America for the group’s earnings outside the
Netherlands. In 2000, the board of directors of ABN-Amro decided that the
bank would operate in the retail market only in the Netherlands, the US and
Brazil, under a strategy to finish their operations in countries where the group
does not have enough size to compete. The Dutch bank sold its retail
commercial bank units in nine countries, such as Morocco and Sri Lanka.
Recently, it announced that it is planning to sell its subsidiaries of commercial
bank in Chile (to BankBoston), Kenya (to Citigroup), and Venezuela (to Banco
del Caribe) (cf. Gazeta Mercantil, 19/11/01, p. B2). ABN-Amro has
traditionally been a universal bank, combining commercial, corporate, private
and investment banking. In Brazil, before the purchase of Banco Real, which
was the Dutch group’slargest acquisition to date and the largest ever in Brazil,
37
ABN-Amro concentrated its operations on private and corporate banking and
to alesser degree on retail banking, although its greatest source of earnings was
automobile financing. Thus, with the purchase of Banco Real, abig retail bank,
ABN-Amro became truly a universal bank in Brazil, with different lines of
businesses and capability to compete with the big local retail banks. The
operation allowed ABN-Amro to consolidate its strategy of specialising in
Latin American pension fund management and personal insurance, areas where
Banco Real was strong. The bank is pursuing arelatively aggressive expansion
strategy, via organic growth, to counter competition from local foreign banks,
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36 The major North American subsidiaries – according to ABN-Amro’s Annual Report 2000 –
include: LaSalle Bank in Chicago, one of the Midwest’s largest banks with US$ 47 billion in assets
and 125 locations; Standard Federal Bank in Troy, Michigan, the Midwest’s thrift with more than
US$ 20 billion in assets and 193 locations; and European American Bank (EAB) in Long Island,
New York, and Metropolitan New York, with US$ 15 billion in assets and 87 offices.
37 In July 1998, ABN-Amro purchased 40% the Banco Real’s share for US$ 2.2 billion. Banco
Real was the fourth biggest domestic private bank in Brazil.with an extension of its branch network and acquisition of small, healthy,
banking franchises.
Spanish banks – BSCH and BBVA – have the advantage of knowing how to
deal with instability as in Spain’s recent history, having more cultural
affinities with Latin America, and some familiarity with the region, as most
of the big Spanish banks had offices, branches or small subsidiaries in Latin
America since the 1970s and early 1980s. Both groups are mainly
concentrated in Spain and Latin America,
38 where since 1995 Santander,
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya and Banco Central Hispanico became, alongside
Citibank, the largest foreign banks in Latin America. Interestingly, while
BSCH is the largest among foreign banks in Brazil, with 6.61% of the market
share (total assets criteria) in 2000, BBVA only has a modest presence in the
most important market of Latin America, with around 1.00% of market
share.
39 Since BBV Banco has found itself on the sidelines in the Brazilian
retail market with a low customer base and no precise focus for its businesses,
the bank has performed poorly. Recently, this bank has started to grow
organically in the Brazilian market.
40
The long-term horizon of Spanish banks has not prevented them from
expanding their presence in Latin America, in spite of the 1997-99 financial
turbulence, in contrast with the behaviour of other foreign financial institutions
that chose to pull out of the region. Spanish banks have been very active in the
commercialisation of new products to deposits, such as lottery-linked
accounts, sometimes even before they were fully regulated, which testifies to
their high capacity for innovation.
41 This permits them to respond more
dynamically to the challenges of the Latin American banking market,
transferring their banking skills, that have been primarily useful in their native
mass retail market, to new markets. Latin America became an important and
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38 In 2000, BSCH obtained 34% of its total net income from Latin America that contributed
for 37% of the group’s asset (Banker, April 2001, p. 69), while BBVAin the same year, according
to data from its 2000 Annual Report, had 32.6% of its assets in Latin America.
39 One possible explanation for the fact that BBVAis adopting a more cautious approach, after
expanding overseas, is that the group is consolidating their activities, seeking to cut costs and
increasing efficiency throughout the BBVA system, including Latin America. At the same time,
the group seems to reorient its strategy with a view to strengthening its position in Europe.
40 According to the newspaper Gazeta Mercantil (15/10/01), BBV Banco expanded its branch
network from 228 in September 2000 to 440 branches in September 2001, and this expansion
occurred meanly in South and Southeast of Brazil. At the same time, it increased the number of
customers from 550,000 to 840,000.
41 In the case of Santander, by the end of the 1980s it began to revolutionize Spain’s retail
banking by introducing mutual funds, high -yield checking and saving accounts.strategic market for the Spanish banks, since they sought to offset the decrease
recorded in net interest income in Spain caused by the decline of interest rates
related to the EMU convergence process. In this sense, the Spanish banks, to
maintain and to support their competitive position, which permits them to
defend themselves against hostile acquisitions by competitors, sought to go
beyond their borders in search of new markets (Calderon and Casilda, 2000,
p. 76). Therefore, both Spanish banks’growth in Latin America was crucial to
their rise in the global and regional ranking of banks. Indeed, BSCH jumped
from 23
rd position in the top euro area banking groups (criteria based on total
assets) in 1995 to 15
thposition in 1999, while BBVAjumped from 27
thposition
to 19
th position in the same period (Belaisch et al., 2001, p. 15).
Both Spanish banks concentrated their business not only in commercial
banking, but also diversified into other financial activities, including
investment banking, insurance and especially pension fund management,
where they together had control of 45% of the private pension fund market in
Latin America in 1999. The novelty in this recent penetration of Spanish banks
in Latin America is that “rather than playing the traditional role of working
alongside non-financial firms as they further their internationalisation process
(providing financing and financial services to such firms)”, they “have
aggressively expanded their core activity – commercial banking – with a view
to building apresence in as many markets as possible” (ECLAC, 2000, p. 164).
The other novelty is that they “are acquiring some of the largest domestic banks
in their target countries and entering the general commercial and mass retail
market” (Guillen and Tschoegl, 1999, p. 3).
Overall, the two major Spanish banks, although they are similar in terms of age,
size and focus on retail banking, differed in terms of control, managerial style,
and strategic posture. Consequently, they followed slightly different strategies
in Latin America, although they have had a common regional strategy aimed
at dominating as many national markets as possible. Indeed, Santander (and
later, BSCH) has sought to have a homogenous and strong presence in Latin
America. The emphasis of the group in Latin America has been placed on banks
with a greater share in investment banking and on the acquisition of large
shareholdings from the outset that guaranteed it both ownership and full
management control, generally putting its brand name on the purchased
banks
42. According to Guillen and Tschoegl (1999, p. 14-5), “Santander has
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42 Banco Central Hispanico, before its merger with Banco Santander, focused its strategy in
Latin America with the acquisition of majority stakes in association with a strategic partner, which,
in most cases, was left with the management of the businesses.been most assertive about its Latin American expansion primarily because of
its strong capital base, prior investment banking experience in the region, and
the strong personality and leadership of its chairman – who likes to make
expeditious and far-reaching decisions. Numerous press reports confirm the
contrast between Santander’s ‘presidencialista’ style and BBV’s ‘team style’
of management, which our interviewees singled out as a key difference
between the two banks”.
As for the BBV (and later BBVA), its expansion initially was based on small
shareholdings, minority stakes (providing the project was large enough),
forming partnerships with local banks, which were then gradually built-up
over time. Although this approach has not always ensured ownership, the
bank progressively gained a greater degree of management control over
companies in the group. More recently, BBVA seems to be following
a strategy of consolidation of M&As already done, seeking to cut costs and to
improve efficiency in whole group.
43
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43 See, more, on the strategy of the Spanish banks to Latin America, ECLAC (2000, Chapter III)
and Calderon and Casilda (2000).3 Conclusions
The main conclusions to be drawn from the analyses of this paper are:
a) Both from a historical-empirical and a theoretical-analytical point of view
there are strong reasons to believe that the process of consolidation in the
banking industry is an international phenomenon, as a result of financial
deregulation and technological changes. The new phase of bank
internationalisation is a consequence of this process, with financial
institutions seeking to diversify their activities – in terms of products and
services, and/or geographically – and increase their minimum scale of
operations to remain competitive and to enhance their ability to generate
profits.
b)The recent wave of bank internationalisation is characterised not only by
financial institutions following their existing relationships – serving mainly
home country customers –, but also by a greater integration into the local
markets. Therefore, although historically the pattern of bank international
shareholdings has followed that of the economic integration between
countries, today the actual pattern of expansion depends on a wider range
of factors than just the overall degree of economic integration between
countries. In this connection, Grubel’s theory of internalisation – that states
that the ability to draw on the information and personal contacts between
banks and manufacturing firm’s parent in a foreign country at very low cost
is the main source of comparative advantage of multinational banks – does
not apply to the recent wave of foreign banks expansion in the emerging
countries’ retail banking market. This was typically the case of the Latin
American and Brazilian experiences during the nineties, where some
European banks – BSCH, BBVA, HSBC and ABN-Amro – have mostly
local customers with no previous connection with parents’ firms from the
bank’s home countries.
c) The recent process of banking internationalisation has to be understood in
the broader context of deregulation in Latin America during the nineties,
which made room for the entry of foreign companies into key economic
sectors, such as banking, telecommunications and utilities. This process
resulted from both the privatisation of state-owned companies, including
state-owned banks, and the greater flexibility of legal restrictions
concerning the presence of foreign banks in domestic banking sectors.
41d)According to Focarelli and Pozzolo (2000), banks operating in countries
where the banking sector is larger and more profitable should be able to
export a superior skill and, therefore, be more likely to expand their
activities abroad. Indeed, all the biggest European banks in Latin America
– BSCH, BBVA, HSBC and ABN-Amro – have recently increased their
market shares in their domestic markets via mergers and acquisitions,
attaining top (or important) positions in these markets. Expanding abroad
is not only a source of earnings diversification for these banks, but also
a way to strengthen their position in the European banking market under
the competitive pressure of economic and monetary union.
e) There are some common features in the strategies of the biggest European
banks in Latin America. ABN-Amro, in the Dutch market, and BSCH and
BBVA, in the Spanish market, grew substantially in their domestic market-
pursuing growth strategies based on M&As in order to obtain a leadership
position in their national markets. This policy allowed them to increase
their competitiveness and to reach the necessary size to develop their
international expansion. After they consolidated their positions in their
domestic markets, they expanded abroad, probably preparing themselves
for an increase in European competition under the context of the economic
and monetary union. ABN-Amro, BSCH and BBVAare big banks in small
or medium highly concentrated systems that are increasingly expanding
their operations to other geographical markets, since domestic alternatives
are limited.
f) HSBC is one of the largest banking and financial services organisations in
the world. Like Citigroup, HSBC Group is a global universal bank.
However, the group is still a bank strongly rooted in Asia, in spite of its
worldwide presence. Nevertheless, this feature has changed since the last
decade. Its strategy of ‘managing for value’emphasises the group’s balance
of business and earnings between the older, mature and faster-growing
emerging markets. The motivation of the recent expansion to Latin
America, as well as other investments in different regions, seems to be
related to the strategy of risk diversification, through geographic
diversification of their activities, so that the bank is no longer so Asia-
dependent.
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